cloaked_req
cloaked_req is a Req adapter backed by Rust wreq. You keep Req ergonomics and send fingerprint-sensitive requests with a real browser's TLS and HTTP/2 signature.
Docs: https://hexdocs.pm/cloaked_req
Installation
def deps do
[
{:cloaked_req, "~> 0.7.0"}
]
end
Precompiled NIFs
The package downloads a precompiled NIF for these targets:
aarch64-apple-darwinaarch64-unknown-linux-gnu, glibc 2.34 or newerx86_64-unknown-linux-gnu, glibc 2.34 or newer
The release checks each Linux NIF and fails when it needs a glibc newer than 2.34.
On any other platform, for example Intel macOS or Alpine (musl), build the NIF from source:
- Add
{:rustler, "~> 0.38.0"}to your deps. - Install Rust 1.98 or newer, a C and C++ compiler, cmake, libclang, and git.
- Set
CLOAKED_REQ_BUILD=1when you compile. On musl, also setRUSTFLAGS="-C target-feature=-crt-static". Without it, Rust cannot build the NIF as a shared library.
Usage
Use as a Req adapter:
request =
Req.new(url: "https://tls.peet.ws/api/all")
|> CloakedReq.attach(impersonate: :chrome_136)
response = Req.get!(request)
Set impersonation later on an existing request:
request =
Req.new(url: "https://example.com")
|> CloakedReq.impersonate(:firefox_136)
Adapter options
| Option | Type | Default | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
:impersonate |
atom | nil |
Browser profile (e.g. :chrome_136) |
:cookie_jar |
CookieJar.t() |
nil |
Automatic cookie persistence across requests |
:insecure_skip_verify |
boolean | false |
Skip TLS certificate verification |
:local_address |
IP string or IP tuple | nil |
Bind outbound requests to a specific source IP |
:max_body_size |
pos_integer | :unlimited |
10 MB | Max request and response body size |
:pool |
Pool.t() |
nil |
Dedicated, isolated client and connection pool |
:max_body_size caps both directions: a request body larger than the limit is rejected before sending, and a response body is truncated to an error once it exceeds the limit.
Req's :receive_timeout (default 15s) starts with the request. Until the response headers arrive, it is one window that does not reset: DNS, connect, TLS, and the upload of the request body all count against it, so a large upload on a slow link needs a larger value. After the headers, it bounds each wait for the next body chunk, so a body that keeps arriving has no total limit.
Req connect options
CloakedReq respects these Req :connect_options:
:timeout- connect timeout in milliseconds for DNS, TCP, the proxy tunnel, and TLS, default 30s.:receive_timeoutalso runs during the connect, so the lower of the two applies.:proxy-{:http | :https, host, port, []}proxy tuple:proxy_headers- proxy headers, commonly used for proxy authentication
Unsupported connection options fail with an adapter error instead of being silently ignored.
Req.new(
url: "https://example.com",
connect_options: [
timeout: 5_000,
proxy: {:http, "proxy.example.com", 8888, []},
proxy_headers: [{"proxy-authorization", "Basic " <> Base.encode64("user:pass")}]
]
)
|> CloakedReq.attach(impersonate: :chrome_136)
|> Req.get!()
Req.new(url: "https://example.com")
|> CloakedReq.attach(local_address: {127, 0, 0, 1})
Errors and retries
A timeout, a refused connection, or a closed connection returns %Req.TransportError{} with the reason :timeout, :econnrefused, or :closed, the same struct Req's own Finch adapter uses. Req's default retry: :safe_transient therefore retries it with the usual backoff. Every other failure, such as a TLS or DNS error, an invalid option, or a body over :max_body_size, returns %CloakedReq.AdapterError{} and is not retried.
Cookie jar
Cookies are automatically stored from set-cookie response headers and sent with subsequent requests sharing the same jar. The jar validates the cookie domain against the public suffix list: it rejects cookies set on a public suffix and on a cross-origin domain. A Domain equal to a request host that is itself a public suffix, such as localhost, is kept as a host-only cookie. An explicit cookie header on a request wins over the jar, and the jar adds no cookies to that request. Over HTTP/2 the jar sends one cookie field per cookie.
jar = CloakedReq.CookieJar.new()
# Login: server sets session cookie
Req.new(url: "https://example.com/login")
|> CloakedReq.attach(impersonate: :chrome_136, cookie_jar: jar)
|> Req.post!(body: "user=admin&pass=secret")
# Dashboard: session cookie sent automatically
Req.new(url: "https://example.com/dashboard")
|> CloakedReq.attach(impersonate: :chrome_136, cookie_jar: jar)
|> Req.get!()
Connection pooling
By default every request goes through a shared, bounded client cache: requests with the same impersonation profile, TLS verification, and connect timeout reuse one client and its connection pool. That keeps connection reuse high for most callers without any setup.
For per-identity isolation, build a CloakedReq.Pool. A pool is a dedicated client with its own connections, TLS session cache, and HTTP/2 multiplexing, never shared with another identity. Build one per identity (per account, per proxy persona, per crawl) so a connection opened for one is never reused for another. Hold the pool in a worker's state and pass it to every request that worker makes.
pool = CloakedReq.Pool.new!(impersonate: :chrome_136)
Req.new(url: "https://example.com")
|> CloakedReq.attach(pool: pool)
|> Req.get!()
The pool fixes the client at build time, so when a request runs through a pool, the pool's client governs the impersonation profile, TLS verification, and connect timeout; per-request :impersonate, :insecure_skip_verify, and the :connect_options connect timeout are ignored (still validated if given). Per-request proxy, source address, headers, body, cookie jar, and the receive timeout still apply. Each pool keeps up to 20 idle connections per host.
The client is garbage-collected by the BEAM when the pool struct is no longer referenced, so its idle connections close on their own. A worker that crashes without an explicit teardown cannot leak the pool. To rotate a pool's identity (for example after its upstream proxy exit changes), build a new pool and drop the old struct. Pass :pool_idle_timeout (milliseconds) to bound how long an idle connection is kept before it closes; the default uses wreq's own.
Impersonation profiles
Profiles based on wreq-util 0.2.0. Profile atoms with a dot must be quoted, e.g. :"safari_17.4.1".
Chrome
:chrome_100, :chrome_101, :chrome_104, :chrome_105, :chrome_106, :chrome_107, :chrome_108, :chrome_109, :chrome_110, :chrome_114, :chrome_116, :chrome_117, :chrome_118, :chrome_119, :chrome_120, :chrome_123, :chrome_124, :chrome_126, :chrome_127, :chrome_128, :chrome_129, :chrome_130, :chrome_131, :chrome_132, :chrome_133, :chrome_134, :chrome_135, :chrome_136, :chrome_137, :chrome_138, :chrome_139, :chrome_140, :chrome_141, :chrome_142, :chrome_143, :chrome_144, :chrome_145, :chrome_146, :chrome_147, :chrome_148, :chrome_149
Edge
:edge_101, :edge_122, :edge_127, :edge_131, :edge_134, :edge_135, :edge_136, :edge_137, :edge_138, :edge_139, :edge_140, :edge_141, :edge_142, :edge_143, :edge_144, :edge_145, :edge_146, :edge_147, :edge_148
Opera
:opera_116, :opera_117, :opera_118, :opera_119, :opera_120, :opera_121, :opera_122, :opera_123, :opera_124, :opera_125, :opera_126, :opera_127, :opera_128, :opera_129, :opera_130, :opera_131
Firefox
:firefox_109, :firefox_117, :firefox_128, :firefox_133, :firefox_135, :firefox_private_135, :firefox_android_135, :firefox_136, :firefox_private_136, :firefox_139, :firefox_142, :firefox_143, :firefox_144, :firefox_145, :firefox_146, :firefox_147, :firefox_148, :firefox_149, :firefox_150, :firefox_151
Safari
:"safari_15.3", :"safari_15.5", :"safari_15.6.1", :safari_16, :"safari_16.5", :"safari_17.0", :"safari_17.2.1", :"safari_17.4.1", :"safari_17.5", :"safari_17.6", :safari_18, :"safari_18.2", :"safari_18.3", :"safari_18.3.1", :"safari_18.5", :safari_26, :"safari_26.1", :"safari_26.2", :"safari_26.3", :"safari_26.4", :safari_ipad_18, :"safari_ipad_26", :"safari_ipad_26.2", :"safari_ios_16.5", :"safari_ios_17.2", :"safari_ios_17.4.1", :"safari_ios_18.1.1", :safari_ios_26, :"safari_ios_26.2"
OkHttp
:"okhttp_3.9", :"okhttp_3.11", :"okhttp_3.13", :"okhttp_3.14", :"okhttp_4.9", :"okhttp_4.10", :"okhttp_4.12", :okhttp_5
Limitations
- No HTTP/3 or QUIC. wreq speaks HTTP/1.1 and HTTP/2 only, so QUIC transport fingerprinting (JA4QUIC) is out of reach. When you need it, look at the Go library surf, which fingerprints QUIC; reaching it from Elixir means a sidecar or Port instead of a NIF.
- No streaming. The adapter rejects
into:. The request body must be a binary or iodata, so a stream fails. Aform_multipartbody with aFile.Streamis a stream. - Do not set
compressed: true. The profile sends its ownaccept-encoding, and wreq decompresses the response.compressed: truereplaces the profile header and breaks the fingerprint.raw: truehas no effect, because the body is already decompressed. :max_body_sizecounts decompressed bytes.- Finch-only options are ignored.
:inet6,:unix_socket, and:request_timeouthave no effect. Use:receive_timeoutandconnect_options: [timeout: ...]for timeouts.